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This paper explores the question of whether hedge funds engage in front-running strategies that exploit
the predictable trades of others. One potential opportunity for front-running arises when distressed
mutual funds -- those suffering large outflows of assets under management -- are forced to sell stocks
they own. We document two pieces of evidence that are consistent with hedge funds taking advantage
of this opportunity. First, in the time series, the average returns of long/short equity hedge funds are
significantly higher in those months when a larger fraction of the mutual-fund sector is in distress.
Second, at the individual stock level, short interest rises in advance of sales by distressed mutual funds.
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  I.  Introduction 
 Consider  an  arbitrageur who learns that a big investor is about to sell a large amount of a 
particular stock, and who understands that this sale is likely to have a significant price impact.  
How might the arbitrageur take advantage of this knowledge?  Broadly speaking, there are two 
types of trading strategies available to him.  The first strategy, “liquidity provision”, involves the 
arbitrageur buying the stock after the big investor has sold it and knocked down the price, and 
then holding as the price reverts towards its pre-sale value.  The second strategy, “front-
running”, involves the arbitrageur shorting the stock before the big investor has had a chance to 
sell it, and then covering this short position immediately after the sale occurs. 
  While liquidity provision is undoubtedly a socially desirable activity, front-running is 
more controversial.  Indeed, the potentially adverse consequences of front-running have been 
repeatedly pointed out by academics, practitioners and policymakers.  DeLong et al (1990) 
demonstrate that front-running, while individually rational for the arbitrageurs who profit from it, 
can nevertheless push prices further away from fundamentals and increase volatility.   
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) offer a similar analysis of what they call “predatory trading”, 
and present several anecdotal accounts of cases where such activity appears to have played an 
important role.  Perhaps the best-known of these stories comes from the meltdown of Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) in the fall of 1998; it is widely believed that LTCM’s initial 
troubles were magnified by the actions of front-runners. 
  Whatever its implications for market efficiency, it should be noted that there is nothing 
illegal about front-running.  The information that allows arbitrageurs to predict the trades of 
other investors may well come from public sources.
1  This is not to say that there are not also 
                                                 
1 To take one possibility, it may be that certain high-frequency statistical arbitrage strategies are profitable in part 
because they succeed in forecasting imminent order flow.    2
shadier ways to play the game.  For example, attention has recently focused on a particular type 
of front-running, one that relies on inside information leaked by brokers to their favored hedge-
fund clients.  As reported by the New York Times in February of 2007: 
  “The Securities and Exchange Commission has begun a broad examination into whether Wall 
Street bank employees are leaking information about big trades to favored clients, like hedge funds, 
in an effort to curry favor with those clients…Knowledge about a large trade, like the sale of a big 
block of stock by the mutual fund giant Fidelity, would tell a trader which way the stock would 
move…Large mutual fund companies have often complained in the past that Wall Street brokerage 
firms were front-running their trades….But the latest S.E.C. investigation appears to have a new 
twist: Rather than examine whether a bank is trading ahead of its own client by using knowledge of 
the customers trade, the scope of the investigation will allow regulators to see if banks tip their 
valued customers who then go trade at another bank, making the paper trail harder to detect.” 
 
  In spite of all the interest in front-running, both in its legal and illegal forms, there is little 
large-sample evidence that speaks to its general prevalence in financial markets.  This is not 
surprising, given the limited disclosure requirements faced by the sorts of big institutional 
players—hedge funds in particular—who might be thought of as potential front-runners.  For 
example, hedge funds with more than $100M in assets have to disclose their long equity 
positions on a quarterly basis in 13-F filings, but there is no comparable disclosure of their short 
positions, which is a major drawback, given that front-running is likely to involve shorting.  And 
there is no systematic information on hedge funds’ positions in other asset classes, where front-
running is often alleged to have occurred (e.g., emerging-market bonds in the LTCM case).  
  Given these data limitations, we take an indirect approach to the problem.  Rather than 
trying to observe hedge funds in the act of front-running itself, we begin our investigation by 
asking whether, in the time series, hedge funds earn higher returns in those periods when there 
appear to be more good opportunities for front-running.  By analogy, if one suspected a group of 
police officers of taking bribes from drug dealers, but was unable to observe the act of bribery 
directly, it might be informative to ask whether those officers who patrolled the areas with the 
highest levels of drug activity also owned the most expensive houses and cars.   3
  This approach requires us to develop a proxy for time-variation in the front-running 
opportunity set.  Here we build directly on recent work by Coval and Stafford (2007), who study 
“fire sales” by distressed mutual funds.  Coval and Stafford show that when a given stock is 
simultaneously owned by several distressed funds (i.e., funds that have recently suffered big 
outflows of assets under management), that stock is likely to be subject to unusually heavy 
selling pressure and a corresponding drop in price.  Moreover, these fire sales can to some extent 
be predicted ahead of time, since mutual-fund distress is largely a function of poor past 
performance.  Indeed, using only real-time public information, Coval and Stafford are able to 
construct a hypothetical trading strategy that front-runs mutual-fund fire sales—i.e., that takes 
short positions in those stocks most likely to be dumped by distressed mutual funds—and that 
earns significant abnormal returns, on the order of ten percent per year.
2  
  Coval and Stafford (2007) use their hypothetical front-running strategy as a way of 
quantifying the predictable price-pressure effects associated with mutual-fund fire sales.   
However, they stop short of asking whether anybody in the real world actually plays this 
strategy.   This is where we pick up the story.  Our basic premise is the following.  If, as Coval 
and Stafford suggest, mutual-fund distress does in fact create opportunities for front-running, and 
if hedge funds in the aggregate are front-runners, then we should see them earning higher returns 
in those periods when there are more distressed mutual funds.   
  This conjecture is strongly supported by the data.   In the time series, the monthly returns 
of long-short equity hedge funds are significantly positively related to the contemporaneous 
aggregate outflows of distressed mutual funds.  Moreover, the coefficient estimates imply 
noteworthy economic magnitudes.  Although the precise details vary with our specifications, a 
                                                 
2 Frazzini and Lamont (2005) also analyze the price-pressure effects associated with mutual-fund flows.  However, 
unlike Coval and Stafford (2007), they do not investigate the possibility of front-running such flows. 
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one-standard deviation increase in mutual-fund distress is typically associated with a 30 to 40 
basis point improvement in monthly hedge-fund returns. 
  Again, we stress that in spite of the statistical strength of these results, the indirect nature 
of our time-series approach means that it can provide only circumstantial evidence in favor of the 
proposition that hedge funds are active front-runners.  A good deal of skepticism is clearly 
warranted.  In particular, we can imagine two broad types of objections to the front-running 
interpretation.  First, one might argue that our measure of mutual-fund distress is proxying for 
another factor that influences hedge-fund returns through a different channel.  For example, 
mutual-fund redemptions might be higher in periods when the market is volatile, and market 
volatility might be directly beneficial to hedge funds for other reasons (e.g., it creates more 
mispricing and hence more stockpicking opportunities).   Although we can try to control for such 
effects, our ability to do so is undoubtedly imperfect, which leaves the door open to other stories. 
  Second, even if it is the case that mutual-fund distress does have a causal impact on 
hedge-fund profitability, this could be because hedge funds do more in the way of socially 
valuable liquidity provision (i.e., more buying of fire-sale stocks) during times of heightened 
distress—as opposed to more front-running via short sales.  One counter to this argument comes 
from the timing of the relationship.  If hedge funds were providing liquidity to distressed mutual 
funds, one would expect them to earn higher returns in the several quarters after distress spikes 
up, since as Coval and Stafford (2007) show, the negative price impact associated with a fire sale 
reverses only gradually over a period of roughly 18 months.   However, we find that hedge-fund 
returns rise approximately contemporaneously with mutual-fund distress.  This fits better with a 
front-running story, since a front-runner would put on a short position before a fire sale, then 
close it out—and book his profit—at the time that the fire sale actually occurs.     5
  Nevertheless, given these objections, the front-running hypothesis would be on stronger 
ground if we had evidence that spoke more directly to the mechanism in question, i.e., if we 
could actually observe hedge funds short-selling stocks in advance of these stocks being subject 
to fire sales.  Unfortunately, as noted above, there is no source for data on the short positions of 
hedge funds.  However, data on total outstanding short interest from all sources is readily 
available at the individual-stock level.  Using this data, we show that if a stock is subject to a fire 
sale in a given quarter, (say January-March 2006) short interest in that stock is at an abnormally 
high level in the month before the quarter begins (December 2005 in this example); this is in the 
context of a regression that includes stock-level fixed effects as well as a number of other 
controls.  Examining the dynamics more closely, we find that the run-up in short interest is 
concentrated in a roughly six-month period preceding a fire sale.  Thus it appears as if somebody 
is playing the Coval-Stafford (2007) strategy.    
    Overall, then, we offer two complementary pieces of evidence.  First, at the aggregate 
level, hedge funds earn significantly higher returns when more mutual funds are in distress.  This 
is circumstantially consistent with front-running being an important source of hedge-fund 
profitability, but also admits other interpretations.  Second, at the individual-stock level, short 
interest tends to go up sharply in the months before a stock is subject to fire selling by distressed 
mutual funds.  This is more directly suggestive of an active front-running mechanism, but by 
itself does not pin down what class of trader is doing the front-running. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II briefly discusses related work.  
In Section III, we examine the time-series relationship between mutual-fund distress and hedge-
fund performance.  In Section IV, we look at stock-level data, and investigate the evolution of 
short interest around fire sales by distressed mutual funds.  Section V concludes.   6
  II.  Related Literature 
While there is much anecdotal discussion of front-running, there are few systematic 
empirical studies of this phenomenon.  The one exception we know of is an interesting piece by 
Cai (2003), who uses a unique dataset of audit trail transactions to examine the trading behavior 
of market makers in the Treasury bond futures market when LTCM faced binding margin 
constraints in 1998.  Cai finds that market makers engaged in front-running against customer 
orders coming from a particular clearing firm—orders that closely matched various features of 
LTCM’s trades through Bear Stearns.  The market makers traded on their own accounts in the 
same direction as the customers of this clearing firm did, but one or two minutes beforehand.   
There is a large literature on the determinants of hedge-fund returns.  An important strand 
of this work emphasizes loading on tail risks as a source of hedge-fund returns.  In an early 
study, Fung and Hsieh (1997) show that the distributional properties of hedge-fund returns can 
differ significantly from those of mutual funds.  For instance, trend-following strategies (Fung 
and Hsieh (2001)) and risk-arbitrage strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)) have the sort of 
highly nonlinear risk-return characteristics associated with the writing of options.   
Agarwal and Naik (2004) extend this analysis to a wide variety of hedge fund styles.  
They find that tail risk, as proxied by the returns to S&P 500 index options, is important for 
explaining the returns of several hedge fund styles.
3   From our perspective, however, it turns out 
that tail risk is less of an issue.  Agarwal and Naik show that the returns on long-short equity 
funds—the type of fund that we focus on here—can largely be explained by the Fama-French 
                                                 
3 Most of the aforementioned studies look at the returns of various hedge-fund indices.  But there is also evidence 
using individual fund return data, which shows that those funds that take on high left-tail risk outperform those 
funds with less risk exposure (Bali, Gokcan, and Liang (2007)). 
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(1993) three-factor model, a finding which we confirm below.
4  Moreover, the nonlinear risks 
associated with writing options play a statistically insignificant role for this particular strategy.   
  Another important consideration when looking at hedge-fund returns is the ability of 
funds to smooth their reported performance (Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo 
and Makarov (2004)).  This implies that it can be important to account for past market 
movements in explaining current fund returns, particularly for styles that trade relatively illiquid 
securities, or that are otherwise non-transparent.  Most recently, a number of studies point out 
that contagion risk might also be important for explaining hedge-fund returns (Boyson, Stahel, 
and Stulz (2006), Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2007)). 
  In the spirit of this prior work, one contribution of our paper is to put forth a new factor—
namely aggregate mutual-fund distress—that helps to explain the time series of hedge-fund 
returns.   Whether or not one believes the front-running interpretation that we attach to our time-
series results, the mutual-fund distress factor appears to be a robust and economically important 
determinant of the returns to long-short equity hedge funds.   Moreover, at a minimum, it is a 
factor that can be said to be well-motivated by a particular economic theory.  
 
  III.  Mutual-Fund Distress and Hedge-Fund Returns: Time-Series Evidence 
A.  Data Sources 
1.  Hedge-fund returns 
  Our data on hedge-fund returns come from two providers: Credit Suisse/Tremont 
(formerly Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services, or TASS); and Hedge Fund Research Inc., 
henceforth HFR.  Each provider computes numerous sub-indices, corresponding to a variety of 
                                                 
4 Gatev, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006) find that the Fama-French (1993) factors are also important for 
explaining the profitability of pairs-trading strategies. 
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different hedge-fund strategies.  Given that our interest is in funds that trade in equities, and that 
can take short positions, we focus primarily on the Long/Short Equity index from CS/Tremont, 
and on the Equity Hedge index from HFR.
5  However, in the spirit of a placebo check, we also 
experiment with fixed income and global macro indices from each provider.
6  The premise is that 
funds in these latter categories are less likely to be active in the stock market, so their returns 
should not be as sensitive to distress on the part of equity mutual funds. 
  The principal difference between the CS/Tremont and HFR indices is that the former are 
value-weighted, while the latter are equal-weighted.  More specifically, the CS/Tremont indices 
are based on the net-asset-value-weighted returns of the largest funds in their universe, funds that 
in each case collectively comprise at least 85 percent of the net assets under management in the 
given category.  The HFR indices, by contrast, equal-weight the funds in their universe. In order 
to be eligible for the HFR universe, a fund must have at least $50 million under management or 
have been actively trading for at least twelve months.  
  As is well known, hedge-fund reporting to these providers is voluntary, so no single 
provider offers a comprehensive picture of the returns of all hedge funds.
 7  Nevertheless, there is 
reason to believe that, taken together, the CS/Tremont and the HFR data capture a substantial 
fraction of the hedge-fund universe.   For example, working with a larger dataset that includes 
four providers (our two plus CISDM and MSCI), Agarwal et al (2007) note that as of year-end 
                                                 
5 According to HFR, the Equity Hedge category was the single largest hedge fund strategy as of year-end 2006, with 
nearly 30% of industry net assets ($409 billion out of a total of $1.427 trillion). 
 
6 As of August 2007, the composite CS/Tremont index contained 456 funds.  Of these, by far the largest number 
were in the Long/Short Equity index, which had 167 funds.  The fixed income index was composed of 34 funds, and 
the global macro index contained 23 funds.   
 
7 There are several papers that compare the indices produced by different vendors (see e.g. Agarwal and Naik 
(2005)), and some research that compares the indices with the returns of individual funds (Malkiel and Saha (2005)). 
In addition, there is some evidence that the CS/Tremont indices appear to be the least affected by various biases, 
perhaps because of their value-weighted nature (Malkiel and Saha (2005)). 
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2002, 63 percent of the funds in their sample were covered by either CS/Tremont or HFR.   
Moreover, the overlap in the coverage of CS/Tremont and HFR is modest: only 8 percent of the 
funds in the Agarwal et al sample are covered by both.  This suggests that using both of these 
providers gives us meaningful incremental information.
8 
  Our sample period runs from January 1994 to December 2006.   Agarwal et al (2007) and 
others have argued that it is desirable to focus on the post-1994 period, since the data from 1994 
onwards tends to include better coverage of defunct funds, and hence is less subject to 
survivorship bias.  Moreover, the CS/Tremont data are only available beginning in 1994.
9   
  This is not to claim that survivorship bias is completely eliminated in our sample period.  
However, such bias is arguably not as problematic for us as it can be in other contexts, since we 
do not seek to make statements about the absolute average returns to hedge funds—i.e., we do 
not address the question of whether they have unconditionally positive alphas.
10  Rather, we are 
interested in how their returns covary with a particular factor, namely the extent of distress in the 
mutual-fund sector.  It is less obvious how a bias in the data towards surviving funds would 
distort our inferences about this covariance. 
  Table 1 presents some basic information about the monthly excess returns on the indices 
that we examine.  Over the 1994-2006 sample period, the equal-weighted HFR Equity Hedge 
index has a somewhat higher mean monthly excess return than the value-weighted CS/Tremont 
                                                 
8 We have also examined data from a third provider, Barclay.  Like with HFR, the Barclay indices are equal-
weighted.  However, they are only available beginning in 1997.   Over this shorter sample period, the Barclay Equity 
Long/Short index produces results very similar to those we obtain below using the HFR Equity Hedge index, so we 
do not report them separately. 
  
9 The HFR data go back to 1990, but again, data-quality concerns are more pronounced pre-1994. 
 
10 The impact of survivorship bias on measured performance is analyzed by Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson 
(1999).  The related problems of termination and self-selection biases are studied by Ackermann, McEnally, and 
Ravenscraft (1999). 
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Long/Short Equity index, 0.83% vs. 0.68%.
11  It also has a lower standard deviation, 2.51% vs. 
2.89%.  But perhaps most relevant for our purposes, these two indices have a very high 
correlation coefficient of 0.91.  This gives us some confidence that, whatever their 
idiosyncrasies, they capture an essential common component of performance among long/short 
equity hedge funds. 
 
2.   Measures of mutual-fund distress 
  To measure mutual-fund distress, we begin with a sample of funds classified as “equity” 
funds using the objective codes in the CRSP Mutual-Fund Database.  This screen leads us to 
exclude bond funds, money market funds, sector funds, international funds and balanced funds.  
To make it into our sample, a fund must also be identified in the MFLINKS database of WRDS.  
In cases where there are multiple fund share classes, we aggregate these classes into one fund, on 
a value-weighted basis. 
  Next, for each mutual fund j in each period t, we calculate FLOWj,t, which is the 
percentage flow into the fund over the period.  It is defined as: 
 
 FLOWj,t = (TNAj,t – (1 + rj,t)TNAj,t-1)/TNAj,t-1,      (1) 
 
where TNAj,t-1 is the total net assets under management at the end of the previous period, and rj,t 
is the return (net of fees and expenses) over the period.  We compute FLOWj,t at both the 
monthly and quarterly frequencies. 
                                                 
11 This difference in mean excess returns could potentially reflect a greater degree of survivorship bias among 
smaller hedge funds, which play a bigger role in the equal-weighted HFR indices. 
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  At either frequency, a fund is considered to be in distress if it experiences percentage 
outflows greater than some threshold level.  Table 2 gives a sense of how many funds are 
classified as distressed, depending on the threshold that we use.  For example, with a monthly 
threshold of 4%, we label 7.9% of funds as distressed in a typical month, and these funds on 
average represent 2.4% of assets under management among the funds in our sample.  (This 
difference reflects the fact that small funds have more volatile flows and hence are more likely to 
become distressed than large funds.)  In what follows, we use a monthly threshold of 4% as our 
baseline definition of distress, but our results are robust to a wide range of alternative cutoffs.
12 
  Once we have defined a set of distressed funds in each period, we create two measures of 
aggregate distress.  The first, “equal-weight outflows from distressed funds” is an equal-
weighted average of: i) the absolute value of percentage outflows (i.e., the absolute value of 
FLOWj,t) from those mutual funds in distress in period t; and ii) zero for those mutual funds not 
in distress in period t.  The second, “asset-weight outflows from distressed funds” is an assets-
under-management-weighted average of: i) the absolute value of percentage outflows from  those 
mutual funds in distress in period t; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress in period t.
 13  
Note that our sign convention is that more positive values of these measures are associated with 
greater mutual-fund distress.
14 
                                                 
12 Yan (2006) documents that over the period 1992-2001, the median equity mutual fund held a cash balance equal 
to 3.68% of assets.  Thus for a typical fund, an outflow of 4% in a month would necessarily lead to some forced 
liquidations of its stockholdings. 
 
13 For the purposes of these calculations (and after we have already classified funds as distressed or not) we 
winsorize FLOWj,t at its 5% and 95% values within each period.  We do so because there are a number of extreme 
outliers in the flow numbers, including some cases where measured outflows from a fund exceed 100%.  Per 
equation (1), this is presumably due in part to a mismeasurement of the fund’s return rj,t.   However, our results are 
qualitatively similar—albeit a bit noisier—if we do not winsorize at all. 
 
14An alternative approach to measuring aggregate distress is simply to count—on either an equal-weighted or value-
weighted basis—the fraction of funds that are distressed at any point in time.  We view this approach as somewhat 
less desirable, as it amounts to focusing only on the extensive distress margin, and ignoring the intensive margin—  12
  Of the two measures, the latter, asset-weighted one is perhaps more immediately 
intuitive: it simply captures total dollar outflows from all distressed funds, scaled by the current 
size of the mutual-fund sector.  Nevertheless, we believe that the equal-weight measure also has 
some conceptual appeal, particularly to the extent that small distressed funds offer proportionally 
more opportunities for front-running than large distressed funds.  For example, since small funds 
tend to hold fewer stocks than large funds, they have less choice of what to unload when they get 
into trouble, and hence their trades may be easier for a front-runner to predict.  By putting 
relatively more weight on the outflows of such small funds, the equal-weight distress measure 
arguably does a better job of incorporating this effect. 
  Figure 1 plots these two aggregate distress measures on a monthly basis over the period 
1994-2006, using a 4% threshold to define distress.  While the equal-weight measure is 
considerably more volatile, the two are closely correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.859.  
Thus it should come as no surprise that our results below are not sensitive to which of the two 
measures we use.  Another point to note is that there is a distinct tendency for the distress 
measures to spike up in the month of December. 
 
  B.  Results 
  1.  Baseline specification 
  Panels A and B  of Table 3 present the results from our baseline time-series specification, 
using the value-weighted CS/Tremont Long/Short Equity index, and the equal-weighted HFR 
Equity Hedge index, respectively.  Consider first Panel A, which focuses on the CS/Tremont 
index.  In column (1), we warm up with a conventional performance-attribution regression, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
i.e., it ignores the size of the outflows from distressed funds.  Nevertheless, it leads to results that are similar to those 
we report below. 
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which the monthly excess returns on the index from January 1994 through December 2006 are 
regressed against four familiar factors: MKTRF, the excess return on  the value-weighted market 
portfolio; SMB, the return on a portfolio that is long small stocks and short large stocks; HML, 
the return on a portfolio that is long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market 
stocks; and UMD, the return on a portfolio that is long past twelve-month winners and short past 
twelve-month losers.  Of these factors, MKTRF, SMB and UMD come in strongly positive and 
significant, and collectively they explain an impressive amount of the variation of the returns to 
the Long/Short Equity index: the simple R-squared of the regression is 80.1%.  This is consistent 
with prior work (Agarwal and Naik (2004)) which finds that for long-short equity funds, linear 
stock-market factors are the most important explanatory variables, with non-linear option-like 
factors playing a statistically insignificant role. 
  In column (2), we add to these four factors the contemporaneously-measured monthly 
variable DISTRESS, which is just “equal-weight outflows from distressed funds”, as described 
above, using a monthly threshold level of 4%.  The coefficient on DISTRESS is 1.703, and is 
statistically significant, with a t-stat of 3.17.  To get a sense of the economic magnitude of this 
effect, note that the standard deviation of the DISTRESS variable is 0.230%, which implies that 
a one-standard-deviation increase in DISTRESS raises monthly hedge-fund returns by 39.2 basis 
points, or almost five percentage points on an annualized basis.   
  In column (3), we keep all else the same as column (2), but add also POSFLOW, which is 
the mirror image of DISTRESS—i.e., it captures equal-weighted inflows to those mutual funds 
that have positive inflows of greater than 4%.  The motivation for including this variable also 
comes from Coval and Stafford (2007), who note that mutual funds experiencing large inflows 
often tend to mechanically scale up their existing positions, rather than diversifying into new   14
holdings.  Thus, Coval and Stafford suggest, large inflows may also give rise to predictable price 
pressure—a phenomenon they refer to as “fire purchases”—and hence to front-running 
opportunities.  As it turns out, however, the coefficient on POSFLOW, while of the expected 
positive sign, is much smaller than that on DISTRESS, and is statistically insignificant. 
  In column (4), we add lagged values of MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD, and DISTRESS to 
the specification from column (2). The lagged values of the MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD are 
motivated by prior work which shows that measured hedge-fund returns can be sluggish in 
adjusting to market-wide price movements, perhaps due to smoothing of reported performance 
by fund managers (Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)).  
And indeed, the returns to the CS/Tremont index show a significant loading on the lagged value 
of MKTRF.  However, these extra controls have little effect on the contemporaneous DISTRESS 
term, which, at a value of 1.589, remains strongly significant.  And interestingly, the coefficient 
on lagged DISTRESS in this regression is close to zero, and is not statistically significant.  
  The fact that lagged DISTRESS is insignificant cuts against a liquidity-provision 
interpretation of our results, since as Coval and Stafford (2007) show, the mean reversion that 
occurs after a fire sale plays out gradually, over the course of roughly 18 months.  Thus one 
would expect a liquidity provider to earn higher returns for several months after a period of 
increased distress.  In contrast, the contemporaneous nature of the link between DISTRESS and 
hedge-fund returns is more consistent with front-running, since a front-runner presumably closes 
out his position and takes his profit at the moment that a fire sale occurs.   
  In column (5), we further explore the timing of the relationship between DISTRESS and 
hedge-fund returns, by adding a single lead of DISTRESS to the specification from column (4).  
Here we find that the contemporaneous and lead terms of DISTRESS share the explanatory   15
power for returns, with the lead term actually being somewhat larger (1.595 vs. 1.077) and more 
statistically significant.  One possible explanation for this result is that mutual funds are able to 
partially anticipate large outflows, and begin preparing themselves by selling stocks (and hence 
increasing their cash balances) in the month before an outflow hits. Thus some of the fire-sale 
activity associated with a large month-t outflow may start to show up in month t-1.  This story 
has the testable implication that an increase in total mutual-fund cash balances in month t-1 
should portend a rise in the DISTRESS variable in month t. 
Panel B replicates everything in Panel A, but using the equal-weighted HFR Equity 
Hedge index instead of the value-weighted CS/Tremont index. The conclusions that emerge are 
generally quite similar, though a few noteworthy distinctions stand out.  First, using an equal-
weighted index reduces the noise in measured hedge-fund returns, leading to uniformly higher R-
squareds and t-statistics.  For example, in column (2), the coefficient on DISTRESS is now 2.014 
with a t-stat of 4.21, and the R-squared is 86.8%, as opposed to its value of 81.8% in the 
corresponding column (2) of Panel A. 
  Second, with these more precise estimates, the coefficient on POSFLOW in column (3) 
now becomes statistically significant, although it remains much smaller, at 0.462, than the 
coefficient on DISTRESS.   Thus the HFR data offer some support for the proposition that there 
may also be front-running opportunities associated with large inflows into mutual funds.   
Nevertheless, it would seem that the magnitude of this effect is not nearly as large as that 
associated with outflows from distressed funds—a conclusion which seems quite plausible. 
  Third, the lead-lag relationship between hedge-fund excess returns and DISTRESS looks 
a bit different using the HFR data.  Specifically, the coefficient on the first lead of DISTRESS in   16
column (5) of Panel B is close to zero and no longer significant; to a first approximation, what 
matters in this regression is just the contemporaneous DISTRESS term. 
 
2.  A graphical illustration 
  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the regression results discussed above.  In Panel A of Figure 2, 
we create a series of monthly alphas, defined as the residuals from a regression of the returns on 
the CS/Tremont index on the four factors MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD, and a constant.  We then 
plot these alphas against the residuals from a regression of DISTRESS on the same four factors.  
Thus, the slope of the line in this scatterplot corresponds to the OLS coefficient on DISTRESS 
from column (2) in Panel A of Table 3.  In Panel B, we plot the joint time-series evolution of 
these same two residuals.  In Figure 3, we repeat all of this, using instead the HFR index.    
As can be seen from the scatterplots, the regression results that we report appear to 
capture a central tendency of the data, as opposed to just a handful of extreme outliers.  At the 
same time, it is apparent from the time-series plots that the years 1998 to 2000 contribute in an 
important way to our results, since this is a period of especially high volatility in the DISTRESS 
variable.  We do not view this as a shortcoming.  Rather, one might say that the extreme fund 
flows during the dotcom era are a blessing for our methodology, since they provide much of the 
variation in our key right-hand-side variable, thereby increasing the power of our tests. 
   
  3.  Additional controls 
  In Panel C of Table 3, we add a variety of additional controls to the baseline regressions 
from column (2) in Panels A and B.  Specifically, we add: i) MKTVOL, the standard deviation 
of daily market returns in the given month (in column 1); ii) XVOL, the cross-sectional standard   17
deviation of monthly individual-stock returns in the given month (in column 2); iii) TIME and 
TIME squared, where TIME is the numbers of years since the start of the sample period (in 
column 3); and iv) DEC, a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the month of 
December (in column 4). 
  The MKTVOL and XVOL variables represent an attempt to control for the possibility 
that mutual-fund distress is more likely to occur when markets are going through periods of high 
volatility.  The TIME and TIME squared terms are meant to take out any low-frequency time 
trends in the data.  And finally, the DEC dummy is added in light of Agarwal et al (2007), who 
uncover a December seasonal in hedge fund returns—an effect that they attribute to managers’ 
efforts to inflate year-end performance.  Their finding is particularly relevant for us, since 
mutual-fund outflows, and hence our DISTRESS variable, also tend to be elevated in December.   
  As it turns out, none of these added controls materially affect our key results.  For 
example, focusing on the CS/Tremont Long/Short Equity index, the coefficient on DISTRESS 
ranges from 1.544 to 1.960 across the four columns (and remains significant in each case); these 
figures compare with the value of 1.703 in the less heavily-controlled version of the same 
regression in column (2) of Panel A.  Turning to the HFR Equity Hedge index, the coefficient on 
DISTRESS ranges from 1.649 to 2.246 across the four columns; these figures compare with the 
value of 2.014 in column (2) of Panel B.
 15 
 
  4.  Results for fixed income and global macro hedge funds 
  In Panel D of Table 3, we re-run our baseline specification using fixed income and global 
macro indices from both CS/Tremont and HFR.  These regressions can be thought of as a 
                                                 
15 If we add all of these additional controls jointly, the results remain significant: for the CS/Tremont index, the 
coefficient on DISTRESS is 1.242 (t-statistic of 2.01), while for the HFR index it is 2.079 (t-statistic of 5.07). 
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placebo check on our results.  In particular, given that fixed income and global macro funds are 
less likely to be active traders of equities, we should expect their returns to be less strongly 
influenced by distress among equity mutual funds.
16  And, as can be seen, there is no evidence of 
a systematic positive relationship between the DISTRESS variable and hedge-fund returns in 
either fixed income or global macro.  Across all the specifications in Panel D, the coefficient on 
DISTRESS is never statistically significant. 
 
  5.  Varying measures of mutual-fund distress 
  All of the results thus far are based on just a single version of our mutual-fund distress 
measure.  We have always been equal-weighting the outflows of distressed funds, and have been 
consistently using a monthly distress threshold of 4%.  In Table 4, we explore a wide range of 
variations with respect to these choices.  In each case, we run a regression of monthly hedge-
fund excess returns on a particular measure of mutual-fund distress, and on the four factors 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD.  Thus, the regressions are directly comparable to those in 
column (2) of Table 3, Panels A and B.  However, to save space, each column of Table 4 shows 
only the coefficient on the given distress measure; the coefficients on the other four factors are 
suppressed.  Using this format, we examine both equal-weighted and asset-weighted distress 
measures with thresholds ranging in one-percent increments from 2% to 6%.  Altogether, these 
combinations yield 10 different proxies.  Panel A of Table 4 uses the CS/Tremont Long/Short 
Equity index to create our dependent variable, and Panel B uses the HFR Equity Hedge index.    
                                                 
16 We cannot rule out that funds in these categories do some equity trading.  Indeed, the returns to both HFR indices 
load significantly on the stock-market factors MKTRF, SMB, and HML, and the HFR global macro index also loads 
on UMD.  These four factors explain 33.4% of the variation in the HFR fixed income index, and 33.0% of the 
variation in the HFR global macro index.  The HFR fixed income index (unlike the CS/Tremont fixed income index) 
includes convertible bond funds, which could help to explain its exposure to stock-market factors.  
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  When looking at the results in Table 4, it should be borne in mind that the coefficients on 
two different distress measures are not directly numerically comparable to one another, as they 
can have very different standard deviations.  Thus to ease comparability, we report below each 
coefficient the implied effect of a one-standard deviation change in the given distress measure.  
With this metric, it can be seen that the results are generally of a consistent magnitude across the 
whole range of distress measures.   
  In Panel A, with the CS/Tremont index, a one-standard-deviation increase in any of the 
equal-weighted distress measures raises monthly hedge-fund returns by just under 40 basis 
points, while a one-standard-deviation increase in any of the asset-weighted measures increases 
returns by roughly 30 bps. In Panel B, with the HFR index, there is a bit more variability across 
the distress measures, with the economic impact of a one-standard-deviation shock ranging from 
39 to 47 bps for the equal-weighted measures, and from 32 to 39 bps for the value-weighted 
measures.  Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges is one of uniformity across the various 
distress measures.  Of course, this should not be too surprising, as these measures are all highly 
correlated with one another in the time series. 
 
  6.  Dollar magnitudes 
  The above estimates can also be mapped into a statement about how many dollars long-
short equity hedge funds gain from each incremental dollar that flows out of a distressed mutual 
fund.  Note that in the specifications in the right-hand block of Table 4 Panel A, the asset-
weighted distress measures are based on the dollar value of outflows from distressed funds, 
scaled by total mutual-fund assets. Similarly, the CS/Tremont index reflects asset-weighted 
hedge-fund returns.  Therefore, we can recover dollar hedge-fund returns per dollar of distress   20
flows simply by multiplying the estimated coefficient on DISTRESS by the ratio of hedge-fund 
assets to mutual-fund assets. 
Unfortunately, because of the explosive growth of hedge funds, this relative-size ratio is 
highly variable over our sample period. This makes our inferences sensitive to the year upon 
which the calibration is based.  Consider as a first example year-end 1997, which is about one-
third of the way through our 13-year sample period.  The value of equities held by open-end 
mutual funds was $2.019 trillion as of this date, while, according to HFR, total assets under 
management in the Equity Hedge category were $20.4 billion.
17  These figures imply a relative-
size ratio of 1.01%.  If we multiply this ratio by the coefficient of 2.725 on DISTRESS in the 
right-hand block of panel A (this is the coefficient corresponding to a distress threshold of 4%) 
we obtain a value of 2.75%.  In other words, for each additional dollar of distressed mutual-fund 
outflows, the returns of long-short equity hedge funds go up by 2.75 cents.  If we define distress 
using a threshold of 2% instead of 4%, the coefficient estimate of 1.613 in Panel A of Table 4, 
multiplied by the same ratio of 1.01%, yields a figure of 1.63 cents per dollar of outflows. 
These magnitudes are quite modest.  However, if we instead base our calculations on 
year-end 2001—roughly two-thirds of the way through our sample period—things look very 
different.  The relative-size ratio has by this point risen to 6.10%, implying that long-short equity 
hedge funds gain 16.62 cents for each incremental dollar of mutual-fund distress if we define 
distress using a 4% threshold, or 9.84 cents if we define distress using a 2% threshold.  These 
latter numbers would seem to be at the upper end of any plausible range.  We suspect that the 
truth lies somewhere in between, but it is hard to say where.   
                                                 
17 The figure for mutual funds comes from table L.122 of the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts.  HFR’s 
Equity Hedge category closely mirrors CS/Tremont’s Long/Short category, so their estimate of total assets under 
management in this segment roughly captures the size of the universe of long-short funds that we have been 
focusing on in our regressions.  
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  IV.  Does Short Interest Rise in Advance of Fire Sales by Distressed Mutual Funds? 
  A.  Data and Variable Construction 
  Our data on monthly short interest for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks are obtained 
from Bloomberg.  We use this data to construct short interest ratios for each stock in each month.  
Observations on short interest represent positions that close on the first business day on or after 
the 15
th of the month.  Hence we approximate the short interest ratio by dividing total short 
interest by shares outstanding on the closest available day to the 15
th of each month.  Because the 
resulting raw short interest ratio, denoted by SR, is strongly right-skewed, in our regressions we 
use as a dependent variable a log transform LSR, which is given by LSR = log(SR + 0.01%), and 
which is more symmetrically distributed than SR. 
  Our key right-hand side variable is a measure of fire-selling by distressed mutual funds in 
a particular stock.  We construct this measure as follows.  First, for each quarter ending in 
March, June, September or December, and for each stock in our universe, we calculate the 
number of shares bought or sold by every mutual fund in the CDA/Spectrum database that 
reports holdings at both the beginning and end of the quarter.  (These changes in shareholdings 
control for stock splits.)  Next, we define a mutual fund as distressed at the 8% level if it has had 
outflows of greater than 8% over the quarter.  From Panel B of Table 2, this definition 
encompasses 11.7% of funds and 3.9% of fund assets in a typical quarter.  The variable 
FIRESALE{8} is then defined for each stock as the sum of all shares sold by distressed funds in 
a quarter, divided by shares outstanding.  In symbols, for stock i in quarter t we compute: 
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where ΔHoldingsj,i,t is the change in fund j’s holdings of stock i during the quarter.
18  
  Finally, we denote by FIRESALE{8,90} an indicator that takes on the value one 
whenever the continuous variable FIRESALE{8} exceeds the 90
th percentile value for all stocks 
in the same NYSE size tercile, and that takes on the value zero otherwise.
19  FIRESALE{8,90} is 
our baseline measure of whether a stock is subject to a fire sale in a given quarter.  Note that we 
use the entire panel unconditionally to determine the 90
th percentile cutoffs, which means that, 
according to our definition, there may be more fire sales in some periods than others.  In other 
specifications, we also use variables we denote as FIRESALE{8,95}, FIRESALE{6,90} and 
FIRESALE{10,90}.  These variables are constructed analogously, but using either different 
percentile breakpoints in the FIRESALE{8} distribution, or different thresholds for determining 
mutual-fund distress. 
  When we examine the impact of sales by distressed mutual funds, we want to be careful 
to distinguish this from any impact of sales by other, non-distressed mutual funds.  Thus a crucial 
control is SELL, which is simply the total gross number of shares sold in a quarter by all mutual 
funds, divided by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter.  Similarly, BUY is the total gross 
number of shares bought in a quarter by all mutual funds, divided by shares outstanding.   
   In addition to these variables, our regressions include a number of other controls that 
have been found in previous work (e.g., D’Avolio (2002), Asquith et al (2005), and Savor and 
Gamboa-Cavazos (2005)) to be significant determinants of short interest.  These include 
                                                 
18 Our FIRESALE variable is comparable to the PRESSURE_3 variable constructed by Coval and Stafford (2007). 
 
19 Cutoffs are computed by NYSE size terciles in order to allow us to easily study size interactions below.  The 
cutoffs are always highest for the middle tercile and lowest for the smallest tercile of stocks. Consistent with our 
findings on the size interactions, if the cutoff is not conditioned on size tercile, the magnitude of the resulting 
coefficients are in line with those obtained for the middle tercile of firms, and continue to be highly significant.     23
institutional ownership, firm size, turnover, book-to-market, past returns, and the presence of 
convertible bonds in the firm’s capital structure. 
Our institutional ownership measure, IHOLD, is based on the CDA Spectrum Database 
of 13-F filings by large institutional investors, defined as those managing at least $100 million 
dollars in assets.  Specifically, IHOLD is the fraction of a company’s shares that are held by 13-F 
institutions, measured at the end of each calendar quarter. 
The remaining controls are based on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and COMPUSTAT.
20  With respect to firm size, rather than simply including a linear 
size control, we are more expansive, and use a set of 20 dummy variables corresponding to demi-
deciles of the NYSE market-cap distribution in each period.  We do so because the relationship 
between short interest and firm size is highly non-linear.  In particular, short interest has an 
inverted-U shape when plotted against size: it is low among the very smallest micro cap stocks, 
then rises sharply with size through the first two deciles of the size distribution, before flattening 
out and eventually declining with size through the last two deciles of the size distribution  
Our turnover measure, TURN, is a firm’s turnover in a quarter.  BM is a firm’s book 
value divided by market capitalization at the end of the most recent fiscal year.  PRET is a firm’s 
stock return over the past twelve months.  CONVERT is a dummy that equals one if a firm has 
convertible debt outstanding at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Table 5 
displays the full-panel means and standard deviations of all of the variables described above.  In 
Table 5, and in the analysis that follows, all variables except IHOLD and CONVERT are 
winsorized at their 1% and 99% values within each quarter.   
                                                 
20 To be included in our sample, a firm must have the requisite financial data from both CRSP and COMPUSTAT, 
which include book value, market capitalization, and twelve months of past returns.  We also follow other studies in 
focusing on stocks with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, i.e., common stocks of U.S. firms that are listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.  
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  B.  The Level of Short Interest Prior to a Fire Sale                              
  Table 6 presents our basic stock-level regression results, which as before, cover the 
sample period 1994-2006.  Recall that we have quarterly observations of the FIRESALE proxies, 
as well as of the SELL and BUY variables.  The way the regressions are specified, if the 
FIRESALE, SELL and BUY measures are based on mutual-fund activity in a given stock over a 
given quarter (say January-March 2006), the dependent variable LSR corresponds to short 
interest in the stock on about the 15
th of the month before the quarter begins (December 2005 in 
this example).
21  The controls IHOLD, TURN, BM, and CONVERT all reflect data from before 
the quarter begins (i.e., data from up through December 31, 2005).  And PRET is based on 
returns over the twelve months ending one month before the quarter begins (i.e., returns from 
November 30, 2004 to November 30, 2005). 
  In addition to the 20 size dummies, and the controls IHOLD, TURN, BM, PRET, and 
CONVERT, all the regressions also include fixed effects for each quarter, as well as stock fixed 
effects.  The presence of the stock fixed effects implies that we are basing our identification 
solely on within-stock variation in short interest over time.  This fits most naturally with the 
economic story we have in mind.  In particular, if a stock is going to experience a fire sale over 
the quarter January-March 2006, we expect it to have unusually high short interest—relative to 
its own typical levels—in December of 2005.   Nevertheless, in untabulated regressions, we have 
also experimented with removing the stock fixed effects, while maintaining all of the other 
controls.  This leads to results that are similar to those we report in Table 6, albeit a little stronger 
both statistically and economically.  Finally, all standard errors are clustered at the stock level 
                                                 
21 Thus, even though we can observe short interest monthly, only every third month’s value of short interest is used 
in the regressions in Table 6. 
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since we are concerned about temporary stock-level effects which may not be fully absorbed by 
the stock fixed effects.
22 
  In column (1) of Table 6, we use the FIRESALE{8,90} indicator as our measure of fire-
selling.  The coefficient on this indicator is 0.178, with a t-statistic of 15.44.  The quantitative 
interpretation is straightforward: when a stock is to be subject to a fire sale in the next quarter, its 
contemporaneous value of LSR is elevated by 0.178, which means that the raw (unlogged) short 
ratio is 19.48% higher than normal (exp(0.178) – 1 = 0.1948).  At the sample-wide mean short 
ratio of 2.85%, this translates into an 0.56 percentage-point increase in short interest. Thus in 
addition to being statistically significant, the impact of the FIRESALE{8,90} variable on short-
selling would seem to be of a magnitude that is economically interesting.  As one simple 
benchmark, this impact is slightly less than half that associated with having one or more 
convertible bonds outstanding: the coefficient on the CONVERT indicator is 0.436. 
  The coefficients on the SELL and BUY variables are both significantly positive, at 6.957 
and 3.097 respectively.  Given that these variables capture gross selling and buying by mutual 
funds, the results suggest two conclusions.  First, short interest rises in advance of more intense 
gross trading activity by mutual funds.  Second, the fact that the coefficient on SELL is more 
than double that on BUY means that short interest is higher in a given stock when there is 
impending net selling by mutual funds in that stock.  This finding can be given a number of 
interpretations, but one possibility is that net selling by mutual funds reflects some real 
                                                 
22 We have also run specifications that, in addition to stock fixed effects, include a full set of industry-by-quarter 
fixed effects, where industries are defined using the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classification.  This allows us 
to control for possible industry-level trends in short interest.  These regressions yield coefficient estimates that are 
virtually identical to those reported in Table 6, while raising the adjusted R-squared in column (1) from 74.6% to 
76.2%.  We have also confirmed that similar levels of significance obtain in Table 6 if standard errors are clustered 
at the industry level. 
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information about fundamentals, and that whoever is taking short positions is acting on that same 
information in a somewhat more timely fashion. 
  In light of this story, it is important to stress that the coefficient on FIRESALE{8,90} 
reflects an incremental impact of selling by distressed mutual funds, above and beyond the 
impact of selling by all mutual funds (which is embodied in SELL).  Thus our results for the 
FIRESALE{8,90} variable cannot be explained away simply by saying that short-sellers are 
responding to the same information as mutual funds in general; this effect will be absorbed by 
the SELL and BUY controls.  Rather, there seems to be something special about sales by 
distressed mutual funds. 
  The other controls in the regression have the signs that one would expect based on 
previous work.  Short interest is increasing in turnover and institutional ownership, and as 
already noted, is higher when the firm in question has convertible debt outstanding.  Short sellers 
also appear to be tilting in the right direction with respect to book-to-market and momentum, as 
the coefficients on BM and PRET are significantly negative.  Collectively, all the variables—
including the fixed effects—explain a large fraction of the variation in LSR: the adjusted R-
squared of the regression is 0.746. 
  Directly underneath the principal regression in column (1) of Table 6, we report the 
results from a variant in which all the controls are the same, but in which the FIRESALE{8,90} 
variable is interacted with SMALL, MID, and LARGE, which are dummies that equal one if a 
stock belongs in NYSE deciles 1-2 (SMALL), 3-6 (MID), and 7-10 (LARGE), respectively.  The 
goal here is to decompose our full-sample results by broad market-cap categories.   For brevity, 
we do not reproduce the coefficients on the controls, and focus only on the key interaction terms.   27
  The coefficient on FIRESALE{8,90}*SMALL is 0.287, with a t-statistic of 16.16; the 
coefficient on FIRESALE{8,90}*MID is 0.090, with a t-statistic of 5.43; and the coefficient on 
FIRESALE{8,90}*LARGE is -0.008, with a t-statistic of 0.38.  Thus the effects of future fire 
sales on short interest are strongest among small-cap stocks, continue to be economically and 
statistically significant among mid-cap stocks, and are non-existent among large-cap stocks.
23  
This is not an implausible result, particularly if one believes that small stocks are likely to be less 
liquid, and hence vulnerable to more price pressure for a given amount of fire-selling.  If so, it 
would be more attractive for a front-runner to take a short position in a small stock in advance of 
a fire sale, all else equal. 
  Columns (2)-(4) of Table 6 redo the analysis of column (1), with the FIRESALE{8,95}, 
FIRESALE{6,90}, and FIRESALE{10,90} indicators taking the place of FIRESALE{8,90}.  As 
can be seen, the overall results are very similar.  Thus our conclusions do not appear to be 
sensitive to modest changes in the thresholds used to define a fire sale.  
  Finally, in column (5), we use FIRESALE{8}, which is not an indicator, but rather a 
continuous variable measuring total gross selling of a stock by all distressed mutual funds. (As in 
the baseline specification, distressed funds are still defined as those with outflows of greater than 
8% in the quarter.)  While it might be argued that this continuous measure is in some ways less 
appropriate for capturing the extreme nature of a fire sale, it does have one nice feature: it is 
denominated in the same units as the SELL and BUY controls.  Therefore it allows for a direct 
and intuitive comparison of their magnitudes.  As can be seen, the coefficient on FIRESALE{8} 
is 20.012 (with a t-statistic of 4.67), while the coefficient on SELL is 8.156 (with a t-statistic of 
                                                 
23 Although the proportional effect is larger for small stocks than for medium-sized stocks, the absolute effects are 
similar. Mean short interest for stocks in the smallest NYSE tercile is 1.78%, so a coefficient of 0.287 implies a 0.59 
percentage point increase. For medium-sized stocks, mean short interest is 4.53%, so the implied increase based on a 
coefficient of 0.090 is 0.43 percentage points.   28
8.17).  This means that an impending sale by a distressed mutual fund has an impact on short 




  C.  The Dynamics of Short Interest Around Fire-Sale Events                             
  The above results suggest that short interest is elevated prior to fire sales by distressed 
mutual funds.  In other words, if a fire sale is to take place in a given stock during the quarter 
January-March 2006, short interest in that stock is abnormally high in December 2005.   
However, in order to shed more light on the front-running hypothesis, we would like to paint a 
fuller picture of the dynamic evolution of short interest around fire-sale events.  To do so, we 
begin with the baseline specification from column (1) in Table 6, and add a number of event-
time dummies.   
  Specifically, suppose that for a given stock there is a FIRESALE{8,90} event in quarter t.  
We now include in the regression a set of 13 event-time dummy variables labeled t-6, t-5,…t, 
...,t+5, t+6, where our convention is that dummy k takes on the value one in the last month of 
quarter k.  Thus if there is a FIRESALE{8,90} event in the quarter January-March 2006, the t-1 
dummy takes on the value one in December 2005, the t-2 dummy takes on the value one in 
September 2005, the t-3 dummy takes on the value one in June 2005, and so on.  Note that, given 
this convention, the regression in column (1) of Table 6 is just a special case of this one, where 
only the t-1 dummy (for December 2005) is included, and all of the other event-time dummies 
are left out.   
                                                 
24 Note that the total impact of a sale by a distressed fund is obtained by summing the coefficients on SELL and on 
FIRESALE{8}. 
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  It is important to recognize that more than one of the event-time dummies can be turned 
on for a given stock-quarter observation.  This is because fire-sale events are not necessarily 
isolated, and tend to cluster in time for a given firm.  Thus for example, if a stock were to be 
subject to consecutive fire sales in the two quarters January-March 2006, and April-June 2006, 
both the t-1 and t-2 dummies would take on the value of one in December of 2005—since 
December of 2005 effectively precedes one of the fire sales by a quarter, and the other by two 
quarters.  The benefit of this approach is that it allows us to control for the temporal clustering of 
fire sales when tracing out the evolution of short interest.  The cost is that in order to implement 
it fully, we need to restrict our sample to those firm-quarters for which we have data available for 
the entire t-6 to t+6 window surrounding the quarter.  This screen reduces the size of our panel 
from the 176,341 observations used in Table 6, down to 75,562 observations.
25 
  Figure 4 shows the results of this exercise, plotting the coefficients on the event-time 
dummies, along with the associated confidence intervals.  As can be seen, if a fire sale occurs 
over the course of quarter t (say January-March of 2006), short interest is rising sharply by the 
end of quarter t-2 (September 2005), reaches a peak at the end of quarter t-1 (December 2005), 
and then falls steadily through the end of quarter t+2 (September 2006).
26  In other words, while 
Table 6 tells us that the level of short interest is abnormally high at the end of quarter t-1, we can 
now also see that this high level is the result of an increase in short interest that begins roughly 
                                                 
25 However, we obtain similar results if we use the full panel, and take the crude approach of setting the event-time 
dummies to zero for any quarter in which we are missing data on a given stock. 
  
26 The value of the t-1 dummy (i.e., the peak in Figure 4) is 0.114.  This is lower than the corresponding estimate of 
0.178 in Table 6, for two reasons.  First, the restricted sample used to generate Figure 4 contains larger firms on 
average, and we know from Panel B of Table 6 that the FIRESALE coefficient tends to fall with firm size.  Second, 
the estimates in Figure 4 control for the effects of temporally correlated fire sales, while those in Table 6 do not. 
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three to six months before the onset of a fire-sale quarter, and that starts to reverse itself once the 
fire-sale quarter draws to a close.   
  The event-time evolution of short interest depicted in Figure 4 would appear to fit 
comfortably with a front-running hypothesis.  In particular, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that 
fire sales can be reliably predicted several months ahead of time, based on the relationship 
between mutual-fund flows and lagged mutual-fund performance.  So one might expect front-
runners to begin taking short positions roughly this far in advance of a fire sale.   
 
  V.  Conclusions 
  Rather than restate our results, we close with a couple of further qualifications regarding 
how these results should be interpreted.  First, even if one accepts the proposition that hedge 
funds are engaging in the general kind of front-running that we describe, we cannot speak to how 
they are implementing it—i.e., to what kind of data, either public or private, they are using to 
construct their trading strategies.  For example, it is possible that some funds are using a public-
sources methodology very similar to that laid out by Coval and Stafford (2007): studying 13-F 
filings to get a picture of mutual funds’ holdings, and trying to forecast which ones will become 
distressed based on past performance.  On the other hand, it could be that some funds are relying 
on illegal inside information from their brokers to tell them precisely when a fire sale is coming.  
This more refined information set would naturally lead to higher trading profits on average.  
Nevertheless, as long as there is a greater supply of such inside information when more mutual 
funds are in distress, this mechanism would also generate patterns like those we observe.  Thus 
we have nothing to say about whether any front-running done by hedge funds is of the legal or 
illegal variety.   31
  Finally, and more subtly, even if front-running hedge funds earn higher returns as a result 
of mutual funds being in distress, it does not necessarily follow that these incremental returns are 
at the expense of mutual funds.  This point is most clearly illustrated with a simple example.  
Consider a stock that is trading at $100/share at time 0.  At time 1, a hedge fund gets an advance 
tip that a distressed mutual fund will be selling 100 shares at time 2.  These shares will have to 
be absorbed by the risk-averse “public”, which will cause the price to fall to $98.  If the hedge 
fund does not front-run, the entire price decline is delayed until time 2.  Alternatively, suppose 
the hedge-fund front-runs by short-selling 50 shares to the public at time 1, which drives the 
price down to $99 at this time.  If the hedge fund covers its position at time 2, and if the mutual 
fund’s selling decision is unaffected by the time-1 price movement, the price at time 2 will still 
be $98, since all of the mutual fund’s 100-share sale is again ultimately absorbed by the public.     
  In this example, the hedge fund clearly profits by front-running (it sells 50 shares for $99 
and buys them back at $98), but the distressed mutual fund is no worse off, since it sells its 100 
shares for $98 at time 2 in either case.  Rather, it is the public that is harmed by front-running, 
since instead of getting to buy 100 shares for $98, the public buys 50 shares for $99 at time 1 and 
another 50 shares for $98 at time 2.  Intuitively, by using its inside information about the 
impending fire sale, the hedge fund is able to exploit public investors, who, not knowing the fire 
sale is coming, are content to buy at $99 at time 1.  As a result, the public earns less from 
liquidity provision than it otherwise would. 
  None of this is meant to argue that a distressed mutual fund cannot be hurt by a front-
runner with advance knowledge of its trades; indeed, it is easy to construct alternative scenarios 
where the mutual fund does suffer.
27 Still, it is important to recognize that distressed mutual 
                                                 
27 Following DeLong et al (1990), the key to the mutual fund being harmed in an example like the one above is that 
its own trades be endogenously linked to the interim price at time 1.  If a price decline at time 1 makes the mutual   32
funds and would-be front-runners are not engaged in a bilateral zero-sum game.  From a 
methodological perspective, this implies that, e.g., one would probably not want to try to make 
inferences about the extent of front-running in a given market environment by looking at whether 
mutual funds continue to underperform their benchmarks once they encounter distress.
28  A 
strategy of front-running distressed mutual funds can be profitable even if the front-running itself 
does not further exacerbate their distress. 
                                                                                                                                                             
fund have to sell more than it had originally planned at time 2—say because the poor mark-to-market performance 
between time 0 and time 1 increases time-2 outflows—then the mutual fund suffers directly from front-running. 
 
28 It is known from the work of Carhart (1997) that there is some degree of asymmetric persistence among the 
worst-performing funds—losers tend to stay losers more than winners tend to stay winners.   The logic developed 
above suggests that asymmetries of this sort, while they might appear suggestive, are not likely to be reliable 
indicators front-running activity. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Hedge-Fund Indices 
 
This table reports summary statistics for monthly excess returns on hedge fund indices from both 
Credit Suisse/Tremont and Hedge Fund Research Inc.  From each provider, we collect returns on 
a long/short equity index, a fixed income index and a global macro index.  Returns of 
CS/Tremont indices are value-weighted, and returns of HFR indices are equal-weighted.  Excess 
returns are calculated by subtracting the risk-free interest rate, which is available from Ken 
French’s website. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2006. 
 
Index Mean  St.Dev   Correlation  Matrix 
CS/Tremont Long/Short Equity  0.68% 2.89%   1.00       
CS/Tremont Fixed Income Arbitrage  0.21% 1.05%   0.21  1.00      
CS/Tremont Global Macro  0.79% 3.09%   0.43  0.44  1.00     
HFR Equity Hedge  0.83% 2.51%   0.91 0.16 0.32 1.00     
HFR Fixed Income (Total)  0.36% 0.86%   0.54 0.66 0.49 0.56 1.00   
HFR Global Macro  0.50% 2.04%   0.69 0.40 0.73 0.61 0.58 1.00   36
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Mutual-Fund Distress Measures 
 
This table reports summary statistics for our measures of mutual-fund distress.  Each month and each 
quarter, we calculate the percentage flow into each equity mutual fund.  A mutual fund is considered to be 
in distress if it experiences an outflow greater than a given percentage threshold.  “Equal-weight fraction 
of distressed funds” is the fraction of mutual funds in distress in a given period.  “Asset-weight fraction of 
distressed funds” is the fraction of total fund assets that are in distressed funds in a given period. “Equal-
weight outflows from distressed funds” is an equal-weighted average of: i) the absolute value of 
percentage outflows from mutual funds in distress; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress.  “Asset-
weight outflows from distressed funds” is an assets-under-management-weighted average of: i) the 
absolute value of percentage outflows from mutual funds in distress; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in 
distress. In all cases, more positive values of these measures are associated with greater mutual-fund 
distress.  In Panel A, we present average values of the monthly measures of distress. Panel B repeats this 
information for the quarterly measures. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2006. 
 
Panel A: Average values of mutual-fund distress measures based on monthly flows 
 
Distress  Threshold:  2%    3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Equal-weight fraction of distressed funds  16.8% 11.0% 7.9% 6.2% 5.0%  4.2% 3.6%
Asset-weight fraction of distressed funds 7.9% 4.0% 2.4% 1.7% 1.2%  0.9% 0.7%
Equal-weight outflows from distressed funds 0.61% 0.47% 0.36% 0.28% 0.23%  0.18% 0.15%
Asset-weight outflows from distressed funds  0.27% 0.18% 0.12% 0.09% 0.07%  0.05% 0.04%
 
Panel B: Average values of mutual-fund distress measures based on quarterly flows  
 
Distress Threshold:  4%   6%  8%  10%  12%  14%  16% 
Equal-weight fraction of distressed funds  23.4% 16.1% 11.7% 9.0% 7.3%  6.1% 5.3%
Asset-weight fraction of distressed funds 13.1% 6.9% 3.9% 2.4% 1.7%  1.1% 0.8%
Equal-weight outflows from distressed funds 1.78% 1.41% 1.10% 0.86% 0.68%  0.53% 0.43%
Asset-weight outflows from distressed funds  0.94% 0.63% 0.43% 0.30% 0.22%  0.15% 0.11%
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Table 3: Hedge-Fund Excess Returns and Mutual-Fund Distress, 1994-2006 
 
This table shows monthly time-series regressions of hedge-fund excess returns on measures of mutual-
fund distress.  MKTRF is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is the return on 
a portfolio that is long small stocks and short large stocks, HML is the return on a portfolio that is long 
high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks, and UMD is the return on a portfolio 
that is long past twelve-month winners and short past twelve-month losers.  DISTRESS is “Equal-weight 
outflows from distressed funds”, as defined in Table 2, using a threshold of 4%.  POSFLOW is the 
positive mirror image of DISTRESS.  LAG( ) and LEAD( ) denote the one month lag and lead operators.  
MKTVOL is the standard deviation of daily returns on a value-weighted market portfolio in a given 
month.  XVOL is the cross-sectional standard deviation of monthly returns among all listed stocks.   
TIME is the number of years since the beginning of the sample.  DEC is a dummy variable for the month 
of December.  t-statistics are shown in brackets and are adjusted for serial correlation using a Newey-
West (1987) estimator with three lags. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2006. 
 
Panel A: CS/Tremont (Value-Weight) Long/Short Equity Index 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant  (%)  0.17% -0.44% -0.64% -0.54% -0.84% 
  [1.45] [2.25] [2.45] [2.50] [3.66] 
MKTRF  0.492 0.489 0.482 0.488 0.490 
  [13.62] [12.71] [12.23] [12.27] [12.71] 
LAG(MKTRF)      0.101  0.099 
       [3.97]  [3.84] 
SMB  0.216 0.227 0.227 0.208 0.213 
  [6.31] [6.88] [6.91] [5.90] [6.32] 
LAG(SMB)     0.019  0.041 
       [0.61]  [1.42] 
HML  -0.018 0.006 0.006 -0.017 0.000 
  [0.39] [0.17] [0.16] [0.36] [0.01] 
LAG(HML)     0.071  0.094 
       [2.03]  [2.63] 
UMD  0.220 0.204 0.204 0.217 0.209 
  [7.46] [8.06] [8.11] [8.11] [7.97] 
LAG(UMD)     0.027  0.029 
       [1.41]  [1.51] 
DISTRESS    1.703 1.707 1.589 1.077 
    [3.17] [3.16] [2.96] [1.93] 
LAG(DISTRESS)       0.069 -0.245 
       [0.15]  [0.48] 
LEAD(DISTRESS)       1.595 
       [ 2 . 8 2 ]  
POSFLOW     0.125    
     [0.83]    
R-squared  0.801 0.818 0.819 0.832 0.844 
Observations  156 156 156 155 154   38
Panel B: HFR (Equal-Weight) Equity Hedge Index 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant  (%)  0.42% -0.30% -1.02% -0.38% -0.42% 
  [4.22] [1.53] [4.89] [1.82] [1.73] 
MKTRF  0.458 0.454 0.428 0.449 0.449 
  [23.13] [24.03] [21.54] [23.61] [23.23] 
LAG(MKTRF)      0.064  0.064 
       [3.41]  [3.39] 
SMB  0.240 0.254 0.251 0.241 0.241 
 [7.40]  [10.39]  [10.54]  [9.74]  [9.75] 
LAG(SMB)     0.023  0.026 
       [1.03]  [1.19] 
HML  0.016 0.045 0.044 0.025 0.027 
  [0.46] [1.80] [1.98] [0.94] [0.98] 
LAG(HML)     0.018  0.02 
       [0.66]  [0.73] 
UMD  0.089 0.071 0.070 0.083 0.082 
  [3.80] [4.20] [4.45] [4.90] [4.76] 
LAG(UMD)     0.017  0.017 
       [1.16]  [1.15] 
DISTRESS    2.014 2.026 1.607 1.548 
    [4.21] [4.90] [3.24] [3.29] 
LAG(DISTRESS)       0.445 0.408 
       [1.12]  [0.98] 
LEAD(DISTRESS)       0.189 
       [ 0 . 5 2 ]  
POSFLOW     0.462    
     [3.46]    
R-squared  0.837 0.868 0.886 0.880 0.881 
Observations  156 156 156 155 154 
   39




Long/Short Equity Index 
  HFR (Equal-Weight)  
Equity Hedge Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant (%)  -0.07% -0.65% -0.71% -0.40%   0.03% -0.85% 0.06% -0.36%
  [0.26] [1.60] [2.06] [1.72]   [0.13] [3.23] [0.20] [1.72]
MKTRF  0.465 0.488 0.490 0.486   0.433 0.453 0.453 0.457
  [10.61] [12.83] [12.70] [12.19]   [20.81] [25.58] [24.48] [23.56]
SMB  0.219 0.220 0.221 0.225   0.247 0.235 0.266 0.256
  [6.56] [5.91] [6.43] [6.85]  [10.19] [9.24] [10.64] [10.53]
HML  -0.006 0.009 0.000 0.001   0.034 0.053 0.059 0.052
  [0.15] [0.25] [0.01] [0.04]   [1.41] [2.16] [2.50] [2.00]
UMD  0.195 0.208 0.206 0.203   0.063 0.080 0.067 0.073
  [7.04] [7.97] [8.05] [7.91]   [3.48] [4.77] [4.06] [4.30]
DISTRESS  1.960 1.563 1.573 1.544   2.246 1.649 2.133 2.237
   [3.56] [3.10] [2.79] [2.26]   [4.61] [3.62] [4.77] [4.25]
MKTVOL  -0.469   -0.425
  [1.78]   [2.31]
XVOL   0.014   0.037
   [0.67]   [2.99]
TIME   0.001   -0.001
   [0.83]   [0.78]
TIME
2   0.000   0.000
   [0.69]   [0.08]
DEC x 100   0.243   -0.343
   [0.48]   [1.19]
R-squared  0.822 0.819 0.820 0.819   0.873 0.873 0.876 0.869
Observations  156 156 156 156   156 156 156 156
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Panel D: Fixed Income and Global Macro Indices 
 
  Fixed Income Hedge Fund Indices    Global Macro Hedge Fund Indices 
 CS/Tremont  HFR    CS/Tremont HFR 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
Constant (%)  0.02% 0.18%    0.43%  -0.20% 
  [0.12] [1.68]    [1.04]  [0.75] 
MKTRF  0.037 0.099    0.294  0.264 
  [1.60] [5.46]    [3.41]  [5.12] 
SMB  0.047 0.089    0.065  0.143 
  [1.62] [4.32]    [0.78]  [3.55] 
HML  0.069 0.056    0.184  0.124 
  [1.71] [2.21]    [1.97]  [2.55] 
UMD  0.015 -0.007    0.159  0.083 
  [0.79] [0.41]    [2.40]  [2.45] 
DISTRESS  0.317 0.205    -0.104  1.084 
  [0.83] [0.81]    [0.10]  [1.72] 
R-squared  0.047 0.337    0.147  0.344 
Observations  156 156    156  156 
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Table 4: Hedge-Fund Excess Returns and Varying Measures  
of Mutual-Fund Distress, 1994-2006 
 
This table shows the coefficient on DISTRESS from multivariate regressions of monthly hedge-fund excess returns on various measures of 
mutual-fund distress, and the four factors MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD.  “Equal-weighted distress” is an equal-weighted average of: i) the 
absolute value of outflows from mutual funds in distress; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress, using monthly threshold levels from 2% to 
6%.  “Asset-weighted distress” is an assets-under-management-weighted average of: i) the absolute value of outflows from mutual funds in 
distress; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress, using monthly threshold levels from 2% to 6%.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
excess return on the CS/Tremont Long/Short Equity Index.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the excess return on the HFR Equity Hedge 
Index.  For each specification, we report the coefficient on DISTRESS, a t-statistic based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with three lags, 
the impact on hedge fund excess returns of a one-standard-deviation change in DISTRESS, and the R-squared of the regression. 
 
Panel A: CS/Tremont (Value-Weight) Long/Short Equity Index 
 
Equal-weighted distress measures    Asset-weighted distress measures 
Threshold  2% 3% 4% 5% 6%    2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 
Coefficient  1.285 1.473 1.703 2.008 2.383    1.613 1.988 2.725 3.735 4.962 
  [3.05] [3.06] [3.17] [3.20] [3.31]    [2.73] [2.56] [2.66] [3.05] [3.15] 
Impact  of 1 SD  0.38% 0.38% 0.39% 0.39% 0.39%    0.30% 0.29% 0.30% 0.32% 0.32% 
R-squared
  0.817 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.819    0.811 0.811 0.811 0.813 0.813 
 
Panel B: HFR (Equal-Weight) Equity Hedge Index 
 
Equal-weighted distress measures    Asset-weighted distress measures 
Threshold  2% 3% 4% 5% 6%    2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 
Coefficient  1.334 1.711 2.014 2.377 2.817    1.698 2.468 3.559 4.221 4.875 
  [2.99] [3.87] [4.21] [4.26] [4.31]    [2.36] [3.00] [3.50] [3.05] [2.67] 
Impact  of 1 SD  0.39% 0.45% 0.46% 0.47% 0.46%    0.32% 0.36% 0.39% 0.36% 0.32% 
R-squared
  0.859 0.866 0.868 0.869 0.869    0.851 0.856 0.860 0.857 0.852 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Short Interest, Fire Sales and Stock-Level Covariates 
 
This table reports the means and standard deviations for short interest, fire sales, and other stock level-
covariates.  LSR is the log of the short interest ratio for a stock (short interest as percentage of shares 
outstanding) plus 0.01%, measured the month before the start of every calendar quarter.  FIRESALE{8} 
is total selling of a stock by all distressed mutual funds within a quarter as a percentage of shares 
outstanding, where a mutual fund is considered to be distressed if it experiences an outflow greater than 
8% over the quarter.  SELL is total selling of a stock by all mutual funds within a quarter as a percentage 
of shares outstanding.  BUY is total purchases of a stock by all mutual funds within a quarter as a 
percentage of shares outstanding.  TURN is turnover in the previous quarter.  IHOLD is the percentage of 
shares outstanding held by institutional investors. BM is a stock’s book-to-market ratio as of the most 
recent fiscal year end.  PRET is past 12-month return.  CONVERT is an indicator that equals one if the 
firm has one or more convertible bonds outstanding.  All variables except IHOLD and CONVERT are 
winsorized at their 1% and 99% values within each quarter.  The sample covers 1994Q1 to 2006Q4 and 
contains 176,341 firm-quarters. 
 
 LSR  FIRESALE{8}  SELL  BUY  TURN  IHOLD BM  PRET  CONVERT
Mean  -5.08 0.0152%  0.16%  0.48%  37.30%  44.79%  0.60  18.94%  9.87% 
Std. Dev.  2.16 0.0716%  0.36%  0.85%  43.54%  32.32%  0.53  83.00%  29.82% 
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Table 6: Short Interest and Fire Sales, 1994-2006 
This table displays regressions of LSR, the log of the short interest ratio plus 0.01%, measured the month 
before the start of every calendar quarter, on various measures of selling by mutual funds.  The 
independent variables include the following.  FIRESALE{8} is total selling by distressed mutual funds 
within a quarter as a percentage of shares outstanding, where a mutual fund is considered to be distressed 
if it experiences an outflow greater than 8% over the quarter.  FIRESALE{8,90} and FIRESALE{8,95} 
are indicator functions that equal one if FIRESALE{8} is greater than the 90
th or 95
th percentiles of the 
distribution. FIRESALE{6,90} and FIRESALE{10,90} are defined analogously, using distress thresholds 
of 6% and 10% instead of 8%.  The control variables, SELL, BUY, TURN, IHOLD, BM, PRET and 
CONVERT are defined in the previous table.  Below the main regression in each column, we also report 
coefficient estimates from a separate regression where that column’s FIRESALE variable is interacted 
with SMALL, MID, and LARGE, which are dummies that equal one if a stock belongs in NYSE size 
deciles 1-2 (SMALL), 3-6 (MID), and  7-10 (LARGE), respectively.  All specifications also have 20 size 
dummies corresponding to NYSE demi-deciles, as well as stock fixed effects and time effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the stock level and the absolute-value of the associated t-statistics are shown in 














  Panel A: Baseline Specifications 
FIRESALE 0.178  0.121  0.142  0.175  20.012 
 [15.44]  [8.74]  [12.41]  [14.95]  [4.67] 
SELL 6.957  7.864  6.789 7.493 8.156 
 [7.19]  [8.06]  [7.00]  [7.73]  [8.17] 
BUY 3.097  3.174  3.138  3.098  3.184 
 [6.59]  [6.73]  [6.67]  [6.59]  [6.75] 
TURN 1.042  1.041  1.042  1.042  1.042 
 [47.60]  [47.45]  [47.53]  [47.57]  [47.42] 
IHOLD 0.988  1.005  0.995  0.989  1.011 
 [19.01]  [19.15]  [19.05]  [19.03]  [19.20] 
BM -0.238  -0.238  -0.237  -0.238  -0.239 
 [11.43]  [11.44]  [11.42]  [11.43]  [11.46] 
PRET -0.096  -0.097  -0.096  -0.096  -0.097 
 [11.40]  [11.46]  [11.40]  [11.33]  [11.45] 
CONVERT 0.436  0.435  0.435  0.436  0.435 
 [14.85]  [14.78]  [14.79]  [14.84]  [14.78] 
Adj. R-squared  0.746 0.745 0.746  0.746  0.745 
 
Panel B: Size Interactions 
(additional covariates omitted) 
FIRESALE 0.287  0.159  0.238  0.295  20.294 
  * SMALL  [16.16]  [7.86]  [13.63]  [15.86]  [2.78] 
FIRESALE 0.090  0.084  0.075  0.087  23.477 
  * MID  [5.43]  [4.00]  [4.36] [5.04]  [4.43] 
FIRESALE  -0.008 0.051 -0.046  -0.029  6.258 
  * LARGE  [0.38]  [1.84] [2.18]  [1.50]  [0.61] 
Adj. R-squared  0.746 0.745 0.746  0.746  0.745   44
 
Figure 1: Plots of Mutual Fund Distress Measures, 1994-2006 
 
This figure graphs our two monthly mutual-fund distress measures from January 1994 to December 2006.  
Each month, we calculate the percentage flow into each equity mutual fund.  A mutual fund is considered 
to be in distress if it experiences a monthly outflow greater than 4%.  “Equal-weight outflows from 
distressed funds” is an equal-weighted average of: i) the absolute value of percentage outflows from 
mutual funds in distress; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress.  “Asset-weight outflows from 
distressed funds” is an assets-under-management-weighted average of: i) the absolute value of percentage 
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Figure 2: CS/Tremont Long/Short Equity Index Alphas vs. Residual Mutual-Fund Distress 
 
These figures illustrate the least squares relationship between the returns on the CS/Tremont Long/Short 
Equity Index and a measure of mutual-fund distress. Specifically, the monthly alphas are constructed by 
regressing hedge-fund returns on the following four factors and a constant: MKTRF, SMB, HML, and 
UMD.  The DISTRESS variable is monthly equal-weight outflows from distressed funds using a 
threshold level of 4%. Residual DISTRESS is the residual from a regression of DISTRESS on the four 
factors and a constant. Panel A shows the two series in scatter-plot form, with the fitted regression line 
included.  The slope of this line is simply the OLS regression coefficient from column (2) in Table 3, 
Panel A. Panel B below shows the same two series separately as a function of calendar time.  
 
Panel A: Scatterplot 
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 Figure 3: HFR Equity Hedge Index Alphas vs. Residual Mutual-Fund Distress 
 
These figures illustrate the least squares relationship between the returns on the HFR Equity Hedge Index 
and a measure of mutual-fund distress. Specifically, the monthly alphas are constructed by regressing 
hedge-fund returns on the following four factors and a constant: MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD.  The 
DISTRESS variable is monthly equal-weight outflows from distressed funds using a threshold level of 
4%. Residual DISTRESS is the residual from a regression of DISTRESS on the four factors and a 
constant. Panel A shows the two series in scatter-plot form, with the fitted regression line included.  The 
slope of this line is simply the OLS regression coefficient from column 2 in Table 3, Panel B. Panel B 
below shows the same two series separately as a function of calendar time. 
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Figure 4: Short Interest Surrounding Firesales 
 
The figure illustrates the evolution of short interest around quarterly FIRESALE{8,90} events.  We run a 
regression of LSR, the log of the short interest ratio plus 0.01%, on all of the controls in Table 6, plus a 
set of 13 event-time dummies, denoted by t-6,…t+6.  The t dummy takes on the value one in the last 
month of a quarter in which a FIRESALE{8,90} event occurs; the t-1 dummy takes on the value one in 
the last month of the quarter prior to which a FIRESALE{8,90} event occurs; and so on.  The figure then 
plots the coefficient estimates on the 13 event-time dummies.  We require a firm to have data available 
over a window from t-6 to t+6 in order to be included in the analysis, and the resulting sample contains 
75,562 stock-quarters.  For the purposes of computing confidence intervals, standard errors are clustered 
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